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3
Experimental design and description
4
The experiments based on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game were conducted in 5 5 groups, of which 2 are control groups, denoted by C1 and C2 respectively, and 3 are 
where 3 b  and 1 c  . This simplified PD game has benefit to cost ratio 3 bc .
14 Each subject in an interaction pair chooses C or D in each round. At the end of 15 each round, the players' choices and payoffs are shown to both of them (on the 16 computer screen). For different groups, the experimental designs are given below.
17
(1) C1 group follows the classic repeated PD games, in which each interaction pair is 18 automatically stopped by the system at the end of each round with probability (Table S1 ). In the 22 experiment, each round has at least 4 single subjects (note that each round has 23 on average 7 single subjects), so we can guarantee that players will not meet 24 their previous partner in the next round.
3
(2) C2 group follows the classic one-shot PD game, in which each interaction pair is 1 terminated at the end of each round with probability 1   .All players are then 2 randomly re-paired in the next round (Table S1 ). stopped by the system with probability 16   , and the other is that at least 10 one player in the interaction pair unilaterally stops the interaction with his/her 11 opponent. At the end of each round, not only the choice and payoff of each 12 player and his/her opponent's choice and payoff are shown on the computer 13 screen but also the reason why the interaction stops is shown when this occurs.
14 If an interaction pair is stopped, then both players are randomly re-paired with 15 new opponents in the next round (Table S1 ). In the experiment, each round has 16 at least 4 single subjects, so we can guarantee that players will not meet their 17 previous partner in the next round. Figure S1a (i.e. time evolution of C) (see also Figure   3 1 in the main text), where the average of C P in the first 60 rounds is 0.72 in C1, 4 0.32 in C2 and 0.56 in T (Table S2 , Figure S2 ).For the average of C P , C1 is 5 significantly larger than T, and T is significantly larger than C2 (Table S3 ). From Figure   6 S1a, it is clear that the cooperation level ( (Table S2) , and the differences between T1 and T2, between T1 and T3, and 12 between T2 and T3 are not significant (Table S3 , Figure S2 ). Table S3 .Mann-Whitney U-test for difference in the average of and C2, between C1 and T, between C2 and T, between T1 and T2, 8 between T1 and T3, and between T2 and T3, where the symbol "*" denotes that the 9 difference is significant at 0.01/12 8.3E-4   (with Bonferroni correction).
10
C1
C2 T1 T2 T3 C1 1 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* < 1E-6* < 1E-6* C2 < 1E-6* 1 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* < 1E-6* T < 1E-6* < 1E-6* T1 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* 1 0.002 < 1E-6* T2 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* 0.002 1 < 1E-6* T3 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* < 1E-6* < 1E-6* 1
11
Notice that, for each interaction pair, there are three possible strategy-pairs in (Table S4) . Furthermore, for each of T1, T2 and T3, the proportions (Table S2 , Figure S4 , Table S4 ). C1  C2  T1  T2  T3  C1 1 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* < 1E-6* < 1E-6* C2 < 1E-6* 1 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* < 1E-6* T < 1E-6* < 1E-6* T1 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* 1 9.6E-5* 0.004 T2 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* 9.6E-5* 1 < 1E-6* T3 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* C1  C2  T1  T2  T3  C1 1 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* < 1E-6* 1.1E-4* C2 < 1E-6* 1 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* < 1E-6* T < 1E-6* < 1E-6* T1 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* 1 0.061 1E-6* T2 < 1E-6* < 1E-6* 0.061 1 < 1E-6* T3
1.1E-4* < 1E-6* 1E-6* < 1E-6* Table S5a . Here, the response to C (D) is measured by the probability 1 that the interaction will be kept, or will be stopped. It is easy to see that individuals' 2 responses to C are very similar between T1, T2 and T3 (Table S6) . The responses to D 3 are also similar between T1 and T2, but are different between T1 and T3, and 4 between T2 and T3 (Table S6) . Table   9 S5b. It is easy to see that in all the treatment groups, the probability of a player to 10 choose keep is much higher if the opponent displays C rather than D. In Table S5c we   11 show the probability that players in a particular interaction pair choose to stop or Table S5c . The probability that an interaction pair C-C (or C-D, D-D) is broken at the 4 end of each round, and the probability that two players display a particular 5 strategy-pair in the next round if the interaction between these two players is kept. Test for difference in the average frequencies that a player chooses to keep the interaction after his/her opponent uses C Test for difference in the average frequencies that a player chooses to keep the interaction after his/her opponent uses D  T1  T2  T3  T1  T2  T3  T1  1 Figure 3 in the main text).
9
Notice that, at any time t , an individual using C has an opponent displaying C 10 (respectively, D) with probability   
Thus, the time evolution of x can be given by 
Thus, the time evolution of x can be described by 
